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I
A CALL FROM BUDAPEST
On May 30, 1996, five months after Bosnia and Herzegovina had signed the
Dayton Accords, Thomas P. Briggs, Senior Advisor of the U.S. Treasury Office
of Technical Assistance (OTA), called from Budapest. Bosnia had agreed to
assume a share of the former Yugoslavia’s external debt, and a critical deadline
in the proceedings, June 11, 2006, was fast approaching. Two days later, the
details began to unfold in a meeting in the OTA regional office in Budapest.
II
THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND THE DAYTON ACCORDS
The war in Bosnia, which was brought to a close with the Dayton Accords at
the end of 2005, is a complex, tragic story, the details of which have continued
to be revealed as proceedings in the Hague bring new facts related to ethnic
cleansing, genocide, systematic rape, and psychological abuse.
The war lasted from 1992 to 1995. It was a multiparty conflict affecting the
whole of the country. The scale of the calamity can be measured in the
numbers: Of a population of 4.3 million people, 250,000 died; 200,000 were
wounded, many with permanent disabilities; 800,000 became refugees abroad;
half the house-holding population lost their homes; and 800,000 became
displaced persons within the country.1 On the economic front, one statistic
speaks volumes: Gross domestic product (GDP) fell from $10.6 billion in 1990
to $2.1 billion in 1995.2
From the perspective of the legal structure that was to prevail after Dayton,
the critical milestones in the war were these: When Bosnia voted for
independence in 1992, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the proceedings and
established their own entity—the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
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Herzegovina—which, later that year, changed its name to Republika Srpska.3 A
series of hostilities began, leading to war and ultimately to the siege of Sarajevo,
the longest in modern history.4 Croatia and the Bosnian Serbs entered into a
compact to divide up portions of Bosnia related to their respective ethnic
groups, pursuant to the Karađorđevo Agreement.5 Hostilities between Bosniaks
and Croats also ensued. Croats had created a separate republic called the
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in November 1991.6 A ceasefire marking
the end of Croat–Bosniak hostilities was signed in 1994.7 The peace agreement
signed a month later—known as the Washington Agreement—established a
federation between the Bosniaks and Croats called the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.8
The Dayton Accords took a practical approach to the resolution of the
conflict. The two entities that then existed—the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska—were recognized and preserved as entities
of the state. The Bosnian state itself, in the nature of a thin, overarching
superstructure, was superimposed over the two republics. This architecture
provided a number of challenges for the assumption, restructuring, and ongoing
servicing of the Yugoslav debt.
The Dayton Accords were supposed to end the violence and put Bosnia on
the road to reconstruction and stability. The Bosnians were not so sure. They
referred to them as the Dayton ceasefire.
III
THE OTA
Shortly after Dayton was signed, the OTA entered the picture. The OTA is
a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury that provides technical
assistance without charge to countries with which the United States enjoys
friendly relations and that are judged to lack sufficient wherewithal to pay for
advice on their own—and in which the United States judges it has a strategic
interest. Assuredly, the United States was keenly interested in events in the
Balkans, and in Bosnia in particular.
Countries can graduate from the program (the ultimate aim). The OTA
places representatives in relevant government offices—ministries of finance,
privatization agencies, and central banks—for extended periods of time, often
3. GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD & OLIVIA SWAAK-GOLDMAN, SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL COURTS. DOCUMENTS AND CASES, VOL. II, PART 1, at 1106 (2000).
4. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & John Hagan, Two Perspectives on Punishment: The Politics of
Punishment and the Siege of Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)Justice,
40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 369, 375–76 (2006).
5. PAUL ROE, ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND THE SOCIETAL SECURITY DILEMMA 34 (2005).
6. Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Second Amended Indictment, ¶ 1 (June 11, 2008).
7. Tony Barber, Croatian Ceasefire Heralds Dawn of Peace, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 31, 1994, at 16.
8. Peter W. Galbraith, Washington, Erdut and Dayton: Negotiating and Implementing Peace in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 643, 645–46 (1997).

STUMPF

Fall 2010]

11/21/2010

REFLECTIONS ON THE BOSNIA DEBT RESTRUCTURING

303

years. In the most successful of these arrangements, the OTA official is
integrated as a valued member of the government team, on occasion even
having an office next to the Minister of Finance.
In concept, the advice given by the OTA is confidential and impartial,
unaffected by the geostrategic goals of the U.S. government. In practice, the
line is not so sharply drawn. The United States is, after all, the largest
stakeholder in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which are creditors of the debtor countries that receive OTA services. It also
has key roles in the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) and in the
U.N. Security Council. As will be seen, the conflicting impulses guiding the
behavior of the United States in administering its advisory role were
noteworthy at a critical juncture in the Bosnia proceedings.
Thus, although the OTA service is free, there is a subtle, immeasurable cost
to the recipient country. That said, the contributions of the OTA have been
exceptional in a number of countries, and Bosnia stands out as a singular
achievement, given all its adversities, both of the fractured situation of the
country and of the multiple roles played by the United States in the resolution
of the conflict.
IV
YUGOSLAVIA’S DEBT
As Bosnia would later inform its creditors, the history of the Yugoslavian
debt focused notably on the large borrowings between 1972 and 1982, when the
total debt rose from $2.4 billion to $20.3 billion. Yugoslavia used the proceeds
to finance investment and consumption at the public- and private-sector levels.
Yugoslavia was a middle-income country with generous access to international
bank financing. The debt crisis of the early 1980s saw that access sharply
diminished. From that point forward, there was no net increase in borrowings,
and Yugoslavia experienced a succession of debt restructurings in negotiations
with the International Coordinating Committee (ICC) for the bank creditors of
the former Yugoslavia, and relied on IMF loans up to the point of the country’s
dissolution in 1991. It did manage to reduce the overall level of external debt in
this period to approximately $15 billion.
Upon the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia’s debt was
apportioned on the basis of end-users where this was feasible (for example,
projects funded by the debt in a particular republic), or in accordance with an
IMF formula for debt of a general nature. The IMF formula was originally
devised in order to determine how the parts of a former member country of the
IMF would share in the debt burden to the IMF itself.
The Dayton Accords required Bosnia to assume its share of this debt—
13.2%, according to the IMF formula. This was based on the relative strength of
the economies within Yugoslavia before independence. Bosnia informed its
creditors that, as of the restructuring-negotiation period, its GDP was no more
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than five percent of the total GDP of all republics.9 In fact, the estimates for
Bosnia’s 1996 economic performance show this most graphically: the ratio of
debt to estimated exports, 600%; and debt to GDP, considerably in excess of
100%.10 The banks also foresaw that Bosnia would not be able to handle its
share based on this formula. For that, and other reasons, their agreements with
Slovenia and Croatia covered a larger share than their allocable percentages
(note that share of liabilities also meant share of assets). The savings were
passed on to Bosnia, which took 10.58% of the commercial bank debt, which
had been consolidated in a New Financing Agreement (NFA) dated September
20, 1988, and related agreements.
Yugoslavia had experienced a deteriorating economic and social
environment in the 1980s, culminating in a political crisis fueled by nationalism
and the impulse toward democratization. Bosnia, one of Yugoslavia’s six
republics, lacked the necessary preparation for accession to a market-oriented
economy. Its industrial economy was centered on armaments production for
Yugoslavia, for other customers of the Eastern bloc, and for emerging markets.
As Bosnia informed its creditors, “Equipment was obsolete, export goods were
oriented to the demands of command economies rather than the international
market, and the terms of trade for raw and semi-finished goods were . . . in
secular decline.”11 Thus, at the outset of the conflict, Bosnia was in a weak and
deteriorating economic condition.
V
THE SHRINKING DENOMINATOR
Debt restructurings tend, to a greater or lesser degree, to follow an
established pattern, which is akin to that of crisis management generally: seek
to stabilize the situation while a solution can be developed; analyze the problem
in an atmosphere of relative calm after stabilization has been implemented;
negotiate a solution based on the sober-sided analysis thus achieved; and
implement.
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, stabilization was achieved by means of
a consent agreement by participating banks. In the case of the NFA rollover,
the banks were asked to consent to the release of joint and several liability of
the republic and defined entities within the republic under the NFA and to
certain technical waivers to facilitate the transaction. This was a prerequisite to
the republic’s assumption of its portion of the NFA debt and the republic’s
undertaking to service the debt directly, in accordance with the terms of any
restructuring agreed to by the creditors. The waiver required a vote of the
holders of not less than two-thirds of the debt then remaining in the NFA. In
the case of Bosnia, particular circumstances conspired to limit the amount of
9. Bond Information Memorandum, supra note 1, at 23.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 9–10.
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time available to obtain the waiver. The denominator was shrinking with each
settlement, starting with Slovenia. As more debt was eliminated from the NFA,
the blocking percentage held by the so-called connected persons—persons
connected with the Serbian government—went up. After June 11, 1996, the
likely percentage would exceed one-third, thereby constituting a blocking
faction that could have defeated the consent.
The ICC confirmed that the requisite consents had been received on June
10, 1996. This was not the only cliffhanger associated with the consent process.
By its terms, the benefits of the consent ceased to apply if an agreement in
principle between Bosnia and the ICC had not been reached by June 30, 1997,
and the transaction had not closed by December 31, 1997. The agreement-inprinciple date was intentionally lengthy to take account of the massive
uncertainties facing Bosnia at the time the waiver was solicited. Yet that
deadline posed challenges for reasons that were not part of the uncertainties
contemplated by the parties to the consent.
VI
IN SARAJEVO
After the waiver process was completed, the scene shifted to Sarajevo.
Briggs had already been traveling there repeatedly since the beginning of the
OTA engagement in Bosnia. The original OTA mission was budgetary and for
other technical support, but Briggs saw that the debt issue was going to be
fundamental to the reconstruction effort and steered the OTA toward the
process at its outset.
Notwithstanding Dayton, it was still a hazardous time in Sarajevo. Briggs
was meeting in a café at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn (the scene of much violence
during the siege) when the last person to die in the conflict was killed by a
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 100 yards away. A French artillery crew
returned fire, apparently without effect. Briggs’s taxi narrowly missed being hit
by an RPG fired from the same direction the following morning.
With that last death, however, the nightmare siege, in the course of which
thousands had been slaughtered, ended.
In mid-1996, travel to Sarajevo was still by C-130 troop transport. The only
dangerous parts of the trip were flying over territory where antiaircraft artillery
was still not fully accounted for and the landing at the Sarajevo airport, which
was ringed with land mines and thus not open to commercial aviation. Once on
the ground, a USAID van, tires bulging from the extra weight of its armor
plating, seemed an unnecessary precaution, as Sarajevo was at that point
probably one of the safest places in the world, given its enormous concentration
of NATO forces. But one needed to recall that this equipment was a holdover
from a few months earlier when it would have been unthinkable to travel
without it.
Driving into the city, one passed by the remains of many newly constructed
high-rise buildings that had been partially or fully destroyed by artillery fire,
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with rebar twisting in odd, eerie configurations. Outside of Sarajevo in any
direction, and certainly in the Serb stronghold above the town in Pale, one
would not venture on one’s own without an armed escort.
The High Representative’s office was the scene of a number of meetings.
Carl Bildt, the very able High Representative, and a warm host, realized the
importance of the preparations for the negotiation. The offices were notable for
their vast collection of large maps with details that seemed to describe every
square inch of the country. The Dayton boundaries were drawn, and the
ensuing governance of the country was with an eye toward the minute details of
terrain and population makeup.
Electricity was limited, and when the generating capacity had to be rationed,
the power would simply go off without warning, day or night. This might
happen in a basement restaurant in the evening when the room was thrust into
complete darkness—unnerving given the recent past. Or one could be in the
elevator of a hotel and be trapped for hours if the elevator was not equipped
with backup generators.
The siege of Sarajevo was an intimate aspect of the war. The small mountain
town was entirely encircled at close range by artillery, machine guns, and
mortar emplacements. Walking down the main thoroughfares of Sarajevo in the
immediate aftermath of the war, one could see continuous lines of pock marks
in the walls of the buildings at head height. Weapons were aimed at individuals
at close range. Casualties were enormous. A makeshift cemetery in a muddy
field next to the soccer stadium where the 1984 Winter Olympics had taken
place held large numbers of the dead in graves, marked by wooden, handpainted markers.
VII
INITIAL STEPS
Once the OTA was engaged, Briggs went to work helping to organize a
debt-negotiating team. The OTA’s immediate task was to help to bring the
ethnic factions together in a workable committee that could find common
ground on a debt-negotiation strategy. But even before that, it had to help the
government think through why it should recognize the debt at all. Voices were
heard to the effect that any Yugoslav debt should, by definition, be viewed as
having been incurred to strengthen the ability of Serbia and its proxies to wage
armed conflict against Bosnia. Thus, from the point of view of Bosnia, the debt
might have been considered odious or illegal. This position did not take root,
however, because a more powerful view prevailed: that Bosnia show to the
outside world that it was a real, separate, viable republic, capable of shouldering
its allocable share of the debt just as Slovenia and Croatia had agreed to do
before it.
Briggs worked with the Ministry of Finance to put together a negotiating
team. The Bosnians realized from the outset that, in order to have credibility,
the team would require at least one representative of the State, one from the
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Federation, and one from Republika Srpska. The first two were identified early.
It was harder to persuade the Serbs to field a member. When the Republika
Srbska representative joined the team, there was a tense meeting, in which he
clashed with one of the existing members and which degenerated into a
shouting match and threatened to escalate to a fight. The two had been highschool classmates and friends. From that time on, the team melded into an
efficient working group and shared a keen desire to see to a successful outcome.
The Committee members held the titles of Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade
of the overarching State, the Deputy Minister of Finance of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Deputy Minister of Finance of Republika
Srpska.
The initial focus of the Bosnia negotiation process was quite different from
that of Slovenia and Croatia in several respects. The reconciliation process by
which the debt under the NFA was reconciled had been extensively discussed
and resolved in Slovenia and there was no major impulse to reopen that issue.
The asset side was a different matter but did not contribute importantly to the
dynamics of the debt settlement in Bosnia. The issue of connected persons was
also one that had been extensively (and contentiously) dealt with in the earlier
transactions. In the Bosnia case, the ramifications of those earlier decisions
were felt crucially, but the underlying development of the list was not. In part,
the timing of the Slovenia and Croatia deals meant that time would not permit a
relaxed analysis of these issues. The main focus was the shrinking denominator
as creditors exchanged NFA debt for new instruments and ceased to be part of
the NFA-debt-holding group, and as the connected persons gained a
correspondingly greater percentage.
This is not to say that the identity of the connected persons was
fundamentally not of interest to Bosnia. On the contrary, Bosnia was adamantly
opposed to connected persons’ receiving interests in debt that they would have
to pay. Bosnia’s paying money to support its mortal enemy would have been
unthinkable. But the groundwork had been laid for this result to transpire
without considerable additional work, and the Bosnians had other issues not
present in the preceding negotiations that took center stage.
Because of the new constitutional framework, the two entities had to agree
on how much of the debt burden each would bear. The state would be the
obligor, but the state had limited revenues apart from receipts from the entities.
The debt being assumed was, of course, an undivided interest in the totality of
the former Yugoslav debt, but an amount equal to Bosnia’s actual receipts of a
portion of that debt (more or less than the amount assumed) had to be arrived
at in order to determine the share of the entities’ contribution to the state for
debt service. Records were searched in an effort to follow the flow of funds into
one or the other geographic regions. If the result was indeterminable or
insufficient to cover the whole of the debt assumed, there would have to be an
apportionment in accordance with a formula, similar to the concept by which
the debt of the former Yugoslavia had been apportioned. This was largely
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handled by the Bosnian factions, but the OTA supported and encouraged the
reconciliation of differences among the factions so that agreement could be
reached.
Meetings with the ICC began with the consent solicitation and continued as
Bosnia dealt with its domestic structural issues. From the outset, the ICC took
an unsympathetic stance. Its view was that Bosnia would produce a certain
amount of cash flow for debt service, and the only issue was how much and who
was going to get it. It feared pressure because of the circumstances of the war
and the emotions surrounding the hardship of the Bosnia case, but decided not
to yield to that concern and to signal that it would not welcome pressure from
governments or other interested parties on this theme.
VIII
DEBT-SERVICE LEGISLATION
The country had a new framework and a new constitution, but no new body
of laws. A wholly new concept of how the debt would be managed and serviced
had to be devised from scratch. This effort resulted in one of the first laws
passed by the new legislature—the Law on External State Debt.12 It was drafted
by the U.S. Treasury with the external financial and legal advisers, and vetted
by government officials at the technical and political levels. The law needed to
deal with the reality that the entities had primary taxing authority. It had to
contend with debt incurred in three distinct periods that required differing
treatment: debt incurred in the prewar era, debt incurred by the entities during
the war, and debt incurred from the signing of Dayton forward. It had to
provide a mechanism for the entities to budget, in advance of the debt, for bills
they would receive from the state. It had to allocate both on a final-beneficiary
theory, whereby the proceeds of earlier debt could be traced, and on an
unallocable-debt theory, whereby they could not. And it had to accomplish
these objectives in such a way that satisfied the international financial
community that a workable structure for debt servicing had been put in place. It
also had to recognize that, quite apart from state debt, each entity had the
power to incur indebtedness for its own purposes, for which it would be
responsible for providing resources for debt servicing.
In the end, the statute expressly excluded war debt incurred by either entity
from state responsibility; that excluded debt was to remain the sole
responsibility of the entity. The entity was to use its own taxing power to obtain
resources for debt service.
For pre-war international debt (including the portion of the NFA debt
assumed) the law called for the determination of the final beneficiary of the
debt proceeds.13 If the proceeds could be traced to one entity or another, that
entity would be responsible for providing the state with the debt service
12. LAW OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ON FOREIGN DEBT (High Rep. Version, 1997).
13. Id. ch. 2, art. 4, § b.
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attributable to the debt, as modified or otherwise restructured.14 If the final
beneficiary could not be determined, the entities would share the debt burden
in a predetermined ratio.15
IX
THE NEGOTIATION
The timetable for negotiations called for a conventional, three-step process
with generous gaps between each to accommodate slippage: the IMF letter of
intent (by July 1996), Paris Club agreement (by September 1996), and London
Club agreement (agreement-in-principle by June 2007; settlement by December
31, 2007).16 In this classic order, the overall economic plan, with targets for
achievement of predetermined goals, would precede the Paris Club negotiation
and underpin it. The Paris Club members could be confident that their
settlement would be in the context of a rigorous, monitored economic plan so
that the probabilities of repayment would be heightened. The London Club
would then be expected to give debt relief comparable to the Paris Club
agreement.
Events did not unfold as planned, and, in the end, the expected process was
turned on its head. 1996 came and went, and there was neither an IMF
agreement nor a Paris Club agreement. 1997 saw more of the same—no
agreement as to either the IMF or the Paris Club. Meanwhile, the deadline of
June 30, 1997 that was stipulated in the consent, for agreement-in-principle, was
moving inexorably closer. Finally, the negotiating committee and its advisers
determined that the process simply could not await the established sequence
and that London Club negotiations had to begin.
Invitations to the meeting were sent, and relevant government officials
made plans to travel for the meeting with the ICC that would establish the
economic parameters of the debt settlement the country would have to live with
for decades thereafter.
And then suddenly, the United States and the IMF told Bosnia to cancel the
meetings because the Bosnian government officials had to stay in Sarajevo to
work on an IMF letter of intent. And if that meant missing the consent deadline
and wrecking the chances for a London Club settlement, that was not as
important as the IMF letter of intent that was scheduled to have happened over
a year earlier. The OTA was ordered to cancel its plans to attend as well.
This is not the only time the IMF has ignored the realities of legal
undertakings by a sovereign to satisfy private-sector creditors. The IMF
occasionally has trouble realizing that there are real-world consequences to the
courses of action it seeks. And, given the original timetable and the full

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Thomas P. Briggs, Draft Next Steps: Bosnia and Herzegovina: External Debt Resolution 1
(June 14, 1996) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
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knowledge of the legal requirements of the waiver deadline, the IMF actions
were hard to justify. The United States, the IMF, and others thus precipitated a
wave of ill-will in the Bosnian government. The fury was such that, even after
the IMF and others relented and allowed the meetings to go forward, it was
difficult to persuade the government to resume the negotiation. Moreover, the
negotiating timeframe, which, it should be recalled, was set for four months, was
now to be three days.
The Bosnia case was a London Club negotiation that actually occurred in
London. Given the time pressures, the atmosphere was one of permanent
tension. Laptops were spitting out scenarios that had to be raced to caucuses
bartering back and forth on net present value and other financial issues. The
frustration level was high, but there was no choice but to forge ahead toward a
solution. The GDP-performance-bond concept, described below, was the
conceptual breakthrough that finally allowed all parties to come to agreement.
It had a degree of contingency to satisfy the concerns of the Bosnians with the
possibility of sufficient debt recovery to satisfy the banks. With little time to
spare, the agreement-in-principal was reached and the deadline barely met.
X
ECONOMIC RECOVERY, VALUE RECOVERY
In effect, the key issue for the negotiation was how much recovery a warravaged economy could be expected to make in a timeframe compatible with
recognizable international financial instruments. Clearly, the creditors would
not accept the proposition that the GDP, which had collapsed by eighty
percent, would remain that low forever. Yet there were not only the effects of
the war to contend with, but also the fact that Bosnia’s economy was a
command economy before the war with obsolete productive capacity. How
should this be factored into the equation?
When creditors are asked to give debt relief, they regularly consider the
question whether the debtor will be able to regain the capacity to service its
debt in the future. In the private sector, the creditors may require an ownership
stake in the debtor in the context of giving debt relief in order to obtain such
value recovery. In the sovereign context, since equity is not a relevant concept
(in the case of a central government, that is) the value recovery must come in
other forms.
When the debtor is a primary-commodity producer, value recovery has
come in the form of instruments that gain value if the primary commodity rises
in price. For example, Mexico and Venezuela gave instruments related to the
price of oil in their Brady plans. Taking the Venezuela case for illustration, the
Venezuelan debt problem was materially related to the price of oil—its major
income- and foreign-exchange generator. The Venezuela oil obligations value
the Venezuelan oil basket and measure it against a strike price that is adjusted
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by an inflation factor.17 The oil obligations were originally attached to par and
discount bonds pursuant to which creditors gave substantial debt relief based on
the low price of oil.18 Thus, the oil obligations would allow the creditors to
recapture value if circumstances in the oil markets improved and the capacity of
the country to pay correspondingly improved.
In the Venezuela example, another type of bond was first introduced—the
Front-Loaded Interest Reduction Bond (FLIRB), which can be thought of as a
noncontingent value-recovery instrument. A FLIRB begins life with a belowmarket fixed interest rate.19 Typically, over a period of five years or more, the
fixed, below-market rate increases in increments.20 At the fifth (or later) year,
the fixed-interest period ends and the bond moves into floating-rate mode, at a
spread over a floating base rate (London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)).21
Interest during the initial below-market period may be secured by collateral.
The collateral is removed at the end of the fixed-rate period.22 The theory is that
the FLIRBs give the country breathing room to address its financial difficulties,
though only for a while. Unlike the commodity-related instruments, which may
or may not ever go “in the money,”23 the FLIRB follows a predetermined
pattern of lesser and lesser debt relief, culminating in a market-oriented floating
rate.
The FLIRB was invented by a member bank of the Venezuela Brady bank
advisory committee. The institution made a valiant attempt to patent the idea in
the sense of requesting (actually, forcefully arguing for) a fee for the invention.
This was not to happen. It was not the first time that a bank had sought to step
out ahead of its colleagues to insist that its special contribution—time, ideas—
merited special consideration. From the sovereign’s perspective, this request
makes for awkwardness on many fronts. For one thing, it undermines the
cohesiveness of the committee. It opens a Pandora’s Box of potentially
competing claims. And it presents a difficult issue of where the money would
come from to pay the fee. Happily, these thorny issues are resolved by just
saying no.
Bosnia used the FLIRB as one of the two instruments in the package of
bonds offered to the bank creditors. Constituting 35% of the package, the
Bosnian FLIRBs share a number of features of the original FLIRBs. In keeping
with the front-loaded-reduction concept, the FLIRBs were structured such that,
for the first four years, they bore interest at a fixed rate of 2%. For the next
17. Republic of Venezuela, 1990 Financing Plan 20–22 (June 25, 1990) (on file with Law and
Contemporary Problems).
18. Id.
19. Stijn Claessens & Ishac Diwan, Recent Experience with Commercial Bank Debt Reduction: Has
the “Menu” Outdone the Market?, 22 WORLD DEV. 201, 213 (1994).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. “In the money” means, in this context, that the commodity price exceeds the strike price
stipulated in the instrument.
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three years, the rate was 3%. For years eight through ten, the rate was 3.5%.
And from the tenth anniversary of the date of issuance until maturity, the rate
changed to a floating rate—LIBOR (now Euribor) plus 13/16%.24
The second part of the package was a bond that related the obligation to pay
to the GDP per capita of Bosnia. At the time, this bond was an innovation, not
based on any known precedent. Its architecture had to be put together from
scratch. It grew out of a number of discussions with the bank committee, the
advisers, and the government. Fortunately, no institution had its hand out for a
creation fee for this instrument. In part, this may be because the banks were not
the primary authors of the idea: credit most likely belongs more to the OTA
than the banks. Overall, the bond made a breakthrough in the difficult
negotiations and paved the way to agreement.
The GDP Performance Bonds have as their premise the concept that the
Bosnian economy was most closely tied to the German economy. In fact, for the
first ten years following the Dayton Accords, there was to be a currency board
linked to the Deutsche Mark (DM). The GDP-performance bonds were subject
to activation if economic circumstances in Bosnia improved to a level that could
be agreed to reflect debt sustainability for interest and principal service on the
debt. This would not happen until 2007 at the earliest. The GDP trigger is an
on-off switch; there are no gradations. If the average of two consecutive years of
per capita GDP starting in the year 2004 exceeds a strike amount, which is
increased with reference to German inflation, the bonds go live.
Both series are callable. Both are denominated in DMs (now euros).
The trigger is adjusted by German inflation. The base year 1997 trigger is
$2,800 and is adjusted each year thereafter by the consumer price index (CPI)
change. This is calculated by dividing the current year’s CPI by the prior year’s
CPI, multiplying the result by 100, and subtracting 100 from the resulting
product. Thus if the CPI had been 109.8 in 1998 and 105 in 1997 (a typical way a
multiyear inflation index is expressed), the factor used to adjust the trigger is
4.47193%, calculated by dividing 109.8 by 105.1 (1.04471931), multiplying the
resulting figure by 100 (104.47193149), and subtracting 100 (4.47193149%). The
trigger thus becomes $2,800 plus 4.47193% or $2,925.21 for 1998. And so on.
The GDP per capita figure comes from the World Bank, to avoid the moral
hazard associated with allowing the issuer to calculate its own, with the
attendant possibilities of manipulation. The bonds go live if the twoconsecutive-year test is met in the period 2004 through 2017. It was felt that
requiring the trigger to be exceeded in two consecutive years was the safest way
to avoid an unusual spike in economic activity.
Those designing the formula sought a measure of long-term debt
sustainability. Given the catastrophic drop in Bosnian GDP, this was considered
a crucial measure of debt-service capacity. But by the same measure, the
immediate postwar period, before reconstruction had had a chance to take hold,

24. Bond Information Memorandum, supra note 1, at 29.
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was not considered the correct baseline for determining long-term debt-service
capacity. Obviously, given the circumstances, a great deal of educated
guesswork went into the calculus. But the time factors (ten years plus before the
performance bonds could go live) made for an insurance policy against guessing
wrong on the relationship between GDP per capita and debt sustainability.
If the bonds were to go live, the principal would be paid in twenty-four
equal installments beginning six months after the Performance Addition Date25
(if any). Thus, the bonds were structured so that they could have a very longdated maturity. Interest on the GDP-performance bonds accrues only after the
performance-addition date and is at LIBOR plus 13/16%, the same as the
FLIRBs after the front-loaded interest-reduction period has passed.
XI
OBSERVATIONS ON LONG-DATED DEBT SOLUTIONS
Sovereign debt restructurings tend to give rise to long-dated solutions. The
Bosnia case is no exception. The GDP-performance bonds, by design, could not
begin amortizing until a decade after issuance and might not finally be retired
until over thirty years after the settlement. The fiscal agent was required to
make calculations for years before a triggering event would actually make use
of the data.
In other long-tail sovereign restructurings, a number of practical problems
have arisen. The fiscal and other agents handling the issue retire or go on to
other employment. The agency functions are sold from one bank to another.
The paperwork is handled out of multiple offices or, in one case, from the home
of one of the agent employees. Memories fade as to what is to be done. Should
a calculation be done every X months? Who remembers? Even the question of
who is supposed to keep track of the issue is in doubt. Data-maintenance
systems do not seem to function well after ten years.
The clearing systems maintain records that become relevant in this regard.
One difficulty with long-dated issues is that their systems are, in certain cases,
kept by hand and copied on microfiche. The images fade like an old movie and
become hard to read. In a recent case, Euroclear advised that reconstructing
records could take several months and, in the end, might be impossible because
of the illegibility of the records.
Another problem is that the lawyers and other professional advisers on debt
restructurings, particularly in countries with budgetary constraints that do not
have regular access to the international financial markets, are hired for the
transaction alone. When the closing occurs, the mandate and the funding for it
25. See id. at 31–32 (The Performance Addition Date means the Payment Date following the date
on which the Fiscal Agent determines that Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieved per capita Gross
Domestic Product (“GDP”) equal to or greater than the GDP Performance Trigger for two consecutive
calendar years in the period commencing with the year 2004 and ending with the year 2017; provided
that the Performance Addition Date will in no event occur prior to the Payment Date next succeeding
the 10th anniversary of the Issue Date.).
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end. If there are follow-up issues, which are inevitable in complex agreements
of this nature, there is no one to address the question except perhaps an internal
government lawyer who was not present at the creation and does not have the
benefit of the experience of putting together the instruments in the first
instance. One could argue that the instruments should speak for themselves, but
someone has to figure out what they are saying.
There is probably no perfect solution to this dilemma, and certainly the
solution is not to shorten the restructuring period, for this would hardly serve
the interests of the sovereign, or likely the creditors, either. But more thought
needs to be given to mechanisms to police the performance and interpretation
of the instruments until maturity, including a detailed tickler system. (We
worked for a month or more on one such document for a different sovereign
and have no evidence that it was ever put to functional use.) Such mechanisms
might also include a predetermined periodic review of events and circumstances
between the sovereign and its agents, and an outside party given the mandate
and authority to make it happen. (A law firm would likely be the best, given the
professional responsibility and the relative effectiveness of the institutional
memory of such firms.)
XII
POSTSCRIPT
The Bosnian government justifiably considered the transaction a major
milestone that would be noted as such by the world. The world’s attention was
unfortunately drifting elsewhere. In fact, the announcement of the transaction
was little noticed, and Bosnia quickly receded from the front page as Kosovo
and other crises took its place. It is a cautionary note to post-crisis countries
that a strategy for recovery should be undertaken quickly, while world support
is present, but with a realistic appreciation of the medium- and long-term
sustainability of the world’s interest and sympathy.
Recently, over a decade after the settlement was reached, the world’s
attention is beginning to reawaken regarding Bosnia, and not in a positive way.
The portents are ominous. The ethnic tensions effectively frozen in place by the
Dayton constitutional structure have caused a degree of paralysis in the
government. Civil unrest is being felt. And there is even talk of the possibility of
the resumption of violence. It could be that the Dayton Accords will end up
serving as a fragile truce masking powerful forces of disintegration that were
not cured and perhaps even made worse.
Meanwhile, on July 29, 2009, the fiscal agent, Société Générale Bank &
Trust S.A., sent a notice to bondholders stating that the GDP per capita for
Bosnia had exceeded the GDP-performance trigger for 2007 and 2008, the two
consecutive years required to turn the on-off switch in the bonds to on, effective
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on December 11, 2009.26 A number of holders, however, contend that the two
consecutive years of requisite GDP performance occurred in 2006 and 2007.
The debate has given rise to several observations about the GDP–per capita
performance mechanism: (1) The census of Bosnia upon which the per capita
figure is to be based has not been taken since the war, and there are intense
political sensitivities surrounding any such program, given the consequences for
the ethnic composition of the country and its entities; (2) The system by which
national accounts are calculated has only recently been updated to adjust for
the treatment of the informal economy; (3) And there is a triangular effect of
pegging the Bosnian currency to the DM—now the euro—which, when coupled
with the appreciation (in the years under contention) of the euro against the
dollar, has boosted the GDP in dollar terms, which is the relevant term of
reference for the performance bonds.
But it is noteworthy that in the Société Générale release, the GDP figure for
2008 was shown at the level of $18.4 billion.27 This figure comes close to 900% of
the GDP figure for the year the war ended. Even if euro-to-dollar inflation
impact is considered, this is an impressive and hopeful sign of progress in the
country.

26. Notice from the Société Générale Bank & Trust S.A. to the Noteholders 1 (July 15, 2009) (on
file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
27. Id.

